McKelvey [?] proved that for strong simple preference aggregation rules applied to multidimensional sets of alternatives, the typical situation is that either the core is nonempty or the top-cycle set includes all available alternatives. But the requirement that the rule be strong excludes, inter alia, all supermajority rules. In this note, we show that McKelvey's theorem further implies that the typical situation for any simple rule is that either the core is nonempty or the weak top-cycle set (equivalently, the core of the transitive closure of the rule) includes all available alternatives. Moreover, it is often the case that both of these statements obtain.
Introduction
One of the more celebrated results in the theory of preference aggregation over continua is McKelvey's theorem (McKelvey [?] [?]). McKelvey [?] considered the strict majority preference relation for a¯nite set of n individuals, each with Euclidean preferences over a convex set of alternatives in < k . In ¤ We are grateful to John Duggan, Michel Le Breton and an anonymous referee for useful comments on an earlier version of the paper.
this setting, he proved that either the majority preference core is non-empty or the majority preference top-cycle set includes all of the available alternatives (see also Cohen [?] ). In his subsequent paper, McKelvey [?] proved a deeper result that essentially implies McKelvey [?] extends to virtually any preference domain, any set of alternatives representable as topological space, and any strong simple preference aggregation rule (see also Scho¯eld [?] [?]). Here, an aggregation rule is simple if it is completely characterized by its decisive sets, or winning coalitions, and it is strong if, for any coalition of individuals, either the coalition or its complement is decisive (but not both).
An important, but by no means exhaustive, class of simple rules are q-rules, whereby a set of individuals is decisive if and only if it includes at least q members with q strictly greater than half the population. However, the only strong q-rule is the strict majority rule (and then only when the number of individuals is odd); thus McKelvey's theorems do not apply to any supermajority rule.
In this note, we review McKelvey's theorem [?] and study its implications for the entire class of simple rules. The main result is that it is the weak topcycle set, or the core of the transitive closure of any simple rule, rather than the top-cycle set that (typically) includes all alternatives if the core is empty. So although it may not be the case for non-strong simple rules that any two alternatives can be connected by a¯nite sequence of strict preference steps, it is the case that any two alternatives can be connected by a¯nite sequence of weak preference steps. Furthermore, it can be quite generally the case both that the core of a simple rule is nonempty and that the core of the transitive closure of the rule includes all available alternatives.
Model
The model we use is somewhat more restrictive than necessary for the results to follow. It is, however, the canonic form for the spatial model used in applied work. Let N = f1; 2; ::; ng be a¯nite set of individuals and let X ½ < k be a convex set of feasible alternatives (with X assumed to be of full dimension).
Preferences
For all i 2 N , assume that i's preferences are a weak order on X, representable by a continuous and strictly quasi-concave utility function, u i : X ! <. Let U denote the set of all continuous and strictly quasi-concave utility functions on X and let U n = U. A preference pro¯le on X is an n-tuple u = (u 1 ; u 2 ; :::; u n ) 2 U. For any i 2 N and y 2 X, let I i (y) = fx 2 X : u i (x) = u i (y)g. Say that a pro¯le u 2 U satis¯es diversity if and only if, for all y 2 X, for all distinct i; j 2 N , the interior of I i (y) \ I j (y) in the relative topology on I i (y) is empty. For example, Euclidean preferences with distinct ideal points satisfy diversity. Let U ¤ ½ U denote the set of pro¯les satisfying diversity.
Simple rules
Let B denote the set of all complete and re°exive binary relations on X. An aggregation rule is a map, f : U ! B. Given an aggregation rule f, a pro¯le u 2 U, and any pair of alternatives x, y 2 X, write xR f (u) y´xf(u)y, and let P f (u) denote the asymmetric part of R f (u) :
For any x; y 2 X and u 2 U, let P (x; y; u) = fi 2 N :
N is decisive under f if and only if,
Any aggregation rule f induces a (possibly empty) family of decisive coalitions on 2 N . Let L(f) µ 2 N denote the set of all decisive coalitions under f. It is immediate from the de¯nition of an aggregation rule and a decisive coalition that
). An aggregation rule f is simple if it is completely characterized by its decisive coalitions. More precisely, given any proper family of coalitions L ½ 2 N , de¯ne the aggregation rule f L by:
Then f is simple if and only if f´f L(f ) . Examples of simple rules include all q-rules, f q : xP fq(u) y i® jP (x; y; u)j¸q, n=2 < q · n. More generally, it can be shown that an aggregation rule f is simple if and only if it is monotonic (if xP f (u) y and, under some new pro¯le u 0 , x does not fall relative to y in any individual's ordering, then xP f (u 0 ) y), decisive (if xP f(u) y and, under some new pro¯le u 0 , the set of individuals strictly preferring x to y is unchanged, then xP f (u 0 ) y) and neutral (the rule is symmetric with respect to alternatives): see, for example, Austen-Smith and Banks [?, Theorem 3.1].
A simple rule f is collegial if and only if there is some individual who is a member of all decisive coalitions (i.e. \ L2L(f ) L 6 = ;), and it is noncollegial otherwise. All q-rules are noncollegial except for the unanimity rule, q = n. The Nakamura number, s(f), of a simple rule is in¯nity if the rule is collegial, and is equal to the smallest cardinality of any family of decisive coalitions in L(f) with empty intersection otherwise; i.e. f noncollegial implies s(f) = minfjLj : L µ L(f) and \ L2L(f ) L = ;g. The Nakamura number of any noncollegial q-rule is known to be the smallest integer greater than or equal to n=(n ¡ q). So the Nakamura number for strict majority rule is 3 (unless n = 4 and q = 3, when it is 4), and the Nakamura number of the q = n ¡ 1 rule is n. More generally, the Nakamura number of any noncollegial rule falls between 3 and n.
For any aggregation rule f and pro¯le u 2 U, the core for (f; u) in X is the set of best alternatives with respect to the preference relation f(u) :
Given a simple rule f, a preference pro¯le u 2 U, and X ½ < k convex and compact, the core C f (u) is nonempty for all u 2 U if and only if k < s(f) ¡1 (see, for example, Scho¯eld [?]). For example, majority core points are only guaranteed to exist when X is one-dimensional and, if X is at least (n ¡ 1)-dimensional, then cores fail to exist for all noncollegial simple rules at some pro¯les. Moreover, for su±ciently high dimensional spaces (k = 2 in the case of majority rule with n odd), the set of smooth pro¯les for which cores do exist are non-generic (Saari [?] ).
A simple rule f is strong if and only if, for all coalitions
Thus the unique strong q-rule is strict majority rule (q = q m ) if n is odd, and there exist no strong q-rules if n is even. Finally, it is worth noting two easily checked properties of strong simple rules, useful for interpreting the results to follow. First, the Nakamura number of any noncollegial strong simple rule is 3 and, second, under the assumption of strictly convex preferences the core of any strong rule is either singleton or empty.
McKelvey's theorem
The statement of McKelvey's theorem uses the following concepts.
De¯nition 1 Let f be a strong simple rule, x; y 2 X, u 2 U, and i; j 2 N . Say that, with respect to fx; yg :
i is a dummy voter at u if, 8L µ Nnfig;
i is as strong as j at u if, 8L µ N nfi; jg;
Thus
Given a simple rule f, a pro¯le u, and a point x 2 X, the set of feasible alternatives reachable from x via the strict preference relation P f (u) is given by:
Q f(u) (x) = fy 2 X : 9fa 0 ; a 1 ; : : : ; a r g ½ X such that a 0 = x; a r = y; r < 1 and, 8t · r ¡ 1;
Note that Q f(u) (x) = ; if and only if x 2 C f (u). For any set Y µ X, let @Y be the boundary of Y .
Theorem 1 (McKelvey) Let f be a strong simple rule and suppose u 2 U ¤ . Then for any x 2 X, either @Q f (u) (x) = ; or both (1) and (2) obtain: (1) There exists some j 2 N such that,
(2) If y; z 2 @Q f(u) (x) with z 2 I i (y) for some i 2 N nfjg and either i is not a dummy voter or i is as strong as j with respect to fy; zg at u, then there exists`2 N nfi; jg such that z 2 I`(y):
As McKelvey [?, p.1097] argues, the symmetry properties (1) and (2) are knife-edge in the extreme and so unlikely to occur. Figure 1 illustrates these observations for a society N = f1; 2; 3g, X = < 2 and strict majority rule, f´f m .
FIGURE 1 HERE
In Figure 1(a) , individual preferences are Euclidean, i.e. the pro¯le u = (u 1 ; u 2 ; u 3 ) is such that, for each i 2 N and y 2 X, u i (y) = ¡ky ¡ x i k, with kx i k < 1. Furthermore, the ideal points fx 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 g are colinear.
Then the boundary @Q f(u) (x) = I 2 (x) and condition (2) holds for every pair fy; zg ½ @Q f(u) (x). Figure 1(b) describes the same situation except that individual 3's ideal point is perturbed o® the line through x 1 and x 2 ; so u 0 = (u 1 ; u 2 ; u 0 3 ) In this case, both conditions (1) and (2) fail and it can be checked (using, for example, the construction in McKelvey [?] ) that @Q f(u 0 ) (x) = ;. In general, therefore, for any x 2 X, the boundary @Q f (¢) (x) is empty. The consequences of this fact are fairly dramatic.
Because X is a convex set in < k , if the boundary of any subset Y µ X is empty then either Y = ; or Y = X.
1 Consequently, if x 2 X and @Q f(u) (x) = ; then, by de¯nition of Q f (u) (¢) and the core, either x 2 C f (u) or Q f(u) (x) = X. In other words, if the boundary of the set of points reachable from x via P f(u) is empty, either x is a core point for (f; u) or every point in X is reachable from x: De¯nition 2 For any aggregation rule f and pro¯le u 2 U, the top-cycle set for (f; u) in X is given by T f (u) = fx 2 X : 8y 2 Xnfxg; 9fa 0 ; a 1 ; : : : ; a r g ½ X such that a 0 = y; a r = x; r < 1 and, 8t · r ¡ 1;
Thus, x is in the top cycle set if and only if we can get to x from any y via the asymmetric part of f in a¯nite number of steps. And clearly, if x; y 2 T f (u), x 6 = y, then x 2 Q f (u) (y) and y 2 Q f (u) (x). Then the preceding remarks imply that if, for all x 2 X, @Q f(u) (x) = ; then either
McKelvey's theorem essentially asserts that for strong simple rules and any x 2 X, the boundary of the set of points reachable from x is typically empty; that is, @Q f(u) (x) = ; for all x 2 X describes the general case for strong simple rules and pro¯les u 2 U ¤ . Hence, with McKelvey's theorem, we have that in general, for any strong simple rule f and most pro¯les u 2 U ¤ , either the core for (f; u) is nonempty or the top-cycle set for (f; u) includes all points in X. And in view of the genericity of the set of pro¯les with an empty core, the second alternative is the usual case in su±ciently high dimensional spaces.
It is worth emphasising what McKelvey's theorem does and does not imply. The theorem does not imply anything about core existence. Moreover, the theorem does not imply that observed choices under any strong simple rule f are \chaotic", only that if the core is empty then (typically) there exists a preference path linking any two alternatives. It is a theorem on the analytical structure of a class of aggregation rules and not on the empirical behaviour of polities using any rule within the class. Having said this, it is also important to observe that the class of rules covered by the theorem is relatively small; in particular, as remarked above, the result does not include any of the q-rules beyond strict majority rule, and includes the latter only when n is odd. It is therefore of some interest to analyse what if anything the result implies for simple rules as a whole.
The transitive closure of simple rules
The extension of the results reported in section 3 to arbitrary simple rules is of the following form: if the core of f at a pro¯le u is empty then, for all x 2 X, every alternative y 2 X is reachable from x via the weak collective preference relation R f(u) .
De¯nition 3
For any aggregation rule f and pro¯le u 2 U, the weak topcycle set for (f; u) in X is given by T w f (u) = fx 2 X : 8y 2 Xnfxg; 9fa 0 ; a 1 ; : : : ; a r g ½ X such that a 0 = y; a r = x; r < 1 and, 8t · r ¡ 1; a t+1 R f(u) a t g:
Alternatively, we can de¯ne this set via the transitive closure of the induced preference relation, R f(u) . Let f be any aggregation rule, u 2 U, x 2 X and de¯ne: Q w f (u) (x) = fy 2 X : 9fa 0 ; a 1 ; : : : ; a r g ½ X such that a 0 = x; a r = y; r < 1 and, 8t · r ¡ 1;
So y 2 Q w f(u) (x) if and only if y can be reached from x via a¯nite sequence under the weak social preference relation, R f (u) (and clearly,
Thus, if xR T f(u) y then x is ranked indirectly to be at least as good as y, since x can be reached from y via R f(u) in a¯nite number of steps. Then the weak top-cycle set for (f; u) in X is the set of maximal elements in X under the transitive closure relation, R T f(u) :
Let f andf be two distinct simple rules.f is said to be more resolute than f if, for all x; y 2 X and all u 2 U, xP f (u) y implies xPf (u) y. In particular, iff is more resolute than f then xPf (u) y implies xR f (u) y:
Theorem 2 Let u 2 U, f be any simple rule andf be a strong simple rule, more resolute than f. If, for all x 2 X, @Qf (u) 
Proof. If f is strong, then the result is proved above. Assume f is not strong and letf be the relevant strong rule, more resolute than f. By assumption, 8x 2 X, @Qf (u) (x) = ;. So, by an earlier argument, either
Cf (u) is empty or Tf (u) = X. But sincef is more resolute than f;
Therefore, C f (u) = ; implies T w f (u) = X, as required.¤
McKelvey's theorem, Theorem 1, shows that (typically) if a simple rule is strong and the core is empty, then the top-cycle set includes all of the alternatives in X; that is, we can construct a strict social preference cycle that includes all of X. When the rule is simple but not strong, this may not be possible. However, Theorem 2 shows that the price paid for having less than all-inclusive strict preference cycles is that instead we have all-inclusive weak preference \cycles". Equivalently, Theorem 2 says that if the core of a simple rule f(u) is empty, then the transitive closure of the underlying preference relation R f(u) declares all alternatives socially indi®erent: for all x; y 2 X, xR Example 1 Suppose n is odd and let f be any q-rule with q m < q < n. Then majority rule, f m (where q = q m ) is a strong rule and f m is more resolute than f. If preferences are Euclidean and, for all i 6 = j, x i 6 = x j , then by McKelvey [?] either C fm (u) 6 = ; or T fm (u) = X. By Theorem 2, therefore, if C f (u) = ; then T w f (u) = X.¤ Of course, Theorem 2 is predicated on the existence of a suitable more resolute strong rulef for any simple rule f. Example 1 shows that such existence is immediate for q-rules when n is odd; our next result insures such existence quite generally.
Theorem 3 For any noncollegial simple rule f, there exists a noncollegial strong simple rulef that is more resolute than f:
Proof. If f is strong then the result is trivial. So assume f is not strong. Let
Since f is not strong, M 6 = ; and jMj = 2t for some integer t¸1. Partition M into two subsets M 1 and M 2 such that:
By de¯nition of M, L(f) \ M i = ;, i = 1; 2. De¯ne the preference aggregation rulef by:
8x; y 2 X; 8u 2 U; And since, by de¯nition,f is neutral and decisive,f is a simple rule. Moreover, by construction,f is strong, noncollegial and more resolute than f as required.¤ Finally, unlike with strong simple rules, it is possible here to have T w f (u) = X and C f (u) 6 = ;; that is, the core is nonempty yet every alternative is reachable from every other alternative via R f (u) in a¯nite number of steps.
Theorem 4 Let f be a noncollegial simple rule and X be compact. If 2 · k · s(f ) ¡ 2 then there exist pro¯les u 2 U such that C f (u) 6 = ; and T w f (u) = X.
